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Abstract 
On June 12,2003, the Alameda County Public Health Department and Sandia National 
LaboratoriedCA jointly conducted an exercise that used a Weapons of Mass Destruction- 
Decision Analysis Center (WMD-DAC) bioterrorism attack simulation to test the 
effectiveness of the county’s emergency response plan. The exercise was driven by an 
assumed release (in the vicinity of the Berkeley Marina), and subsequent spread, of a 
small quantity of aerosolized, weapons-grade anthrax spores. The simulation used 
several key WMD-DAC capabilities, namely: 1)  integration with an atmospheric 
dispersion model to calculate expected dose levels in the affected areas, 2) a individual- 
tracking capability for both infected and non-infected persons as they made decisions, 
sought treatment, and received prophylaxis drugs, and 3) a user interface that allows 
exercise participants to affect the scenario evolution and outcome. The analysis of the 
county’s response plan included documenting and reviewing the decisions made by 
participants during the exercise. Twenty-six local and regional officials representing the 
health care system, emergency medical services and law enforcement were involved in 
responding to the simulated attack. The results of this joint effort include lessons learned 
both by the Alameda County officials regarding implementation of their bioterrorism 
response plan and by the Sandia representatives about conducting exercises of this type. 
These observations are reviewed in this report, and they form a basis for providing a 
better understanding of grouphndividual decision processes and for identifying effective 
communication options among decision makers. 
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1 Background and Approach 
The Alameda County Public Health Department (ACPHD) Bioterrorism Response Plan 
(BRP), h t t u : / / w w w . c o . a l a m e d a . c a . u s / P u b l i c H e a l t h r r o r i s m . h t m ,  is a 
comprehensive document that identifies specific actions that need to be taken in the event 
of a bioterrorism incident, public health emergency, or major disaster. After seeing a 
demonstration of the WMD-DAC capability at a San Francisco Bay Area Regional 
Emergency Managers Association Meeting, Jim Morrissey, Disaster and WMD 
Coordinator for Alameda County Emergency Medical Services, approached SNUCA 
with a request to hold an exercise that would make use of the WMD-DAC Biological 
Defense Application to test the effectiveness of their BRP. 
The WMD-DAC Biological Defense Application simulates an anthrax attack in a 
metropolitan region (for this exercise, Alameda County, California). The application user 
plays the role of a regional Public Health Officer (PHO) and is able to make decisions 
throughout the course of the exercise based on information generated by the simulation. 
This information is representative of the data a real PHO would have access to during an 
epidemic. The simulation allows the user to conduct a simple epidemiological 
investigation through access to various public health reports such as morbidity and death 
reports, implement a prophylaxis strategy by activation of a simulated US. national 
pharmaceutical stockpile and prophylaxis distribution centers, as well as direct people to 
seek treatment. In addition to models representing Public Health Officer policies and 
data, the simulation utilizes supporting models to characterize and quantify the evolution 
of the event and response actions. These supporting models included threat 
characterization and dispersion, population behavior, historical disease trends, and 
resource utilization models for health care providers, prophylaxis supplies, etc. Figure 1 
shows these various model elements and their relationship in the application. 
In traditional “tabletop” exercises, which are set up to bring together representatives from 
critical organizations involved in disaster detection and response, the sequence of events 
and scenario development are pre-scripted, known to all participants, and often 
unaffected by the actions of the participants. In contrast, the WMD-DAC bioterrorism 
simulation provides an interactive interface so that user inputs or decisions over the 
course of the simulation can influence the outcome. This human-in-the-loop capability 
creates realistic time pressures and links participant actions to the final scenario metrics 
of performance. 
In collaboration with Jim Morrissey and Dr. Rosalyn Ryals, Acute Communicable 
Disease Control Department in the ACPHD, Sandia developed a plan for a WMD-DAC 
based tabletop exercise that provides a unique immersive environment in which local and 
regional officials could exercise and evaluate their responses to a bioterrorism event. For 
the Alameda County BRP exercise, the WMD-DAC simulation was tailored to the 
Alameda County region and links between WMD-DAC supported decision points and 
response actions and the BRP were identified. Figures 2 and 3, taken from the ACPHD 
BRP, show the procedures to be followed for reporting suspected bioterrorism illnesses 
and the steps taken in “Response Operations” to address the event in the ACPHD, 
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of the functional model elements and their relationship in the 
WMD-DAC Biologid Defense Application. 
respectively. The overlay boxes in these figures labeled “WMD-DAC Overlap” identify 
areas in the BRP that intersect with elements incorporated into the WMD-DAC 
bioterrorism attack simulation. 
The intent of the joint exercise was to bring as many local and regional officials as 
possible together representing key elements of the BRP in order to test their response to a 
simulated, deliberate release and subsequent spread of anthrax spores in Alameda 
County. During preliminary testing of the simulation, it was determined that the 
proposed scenario would involve the participation of health care and emergency response 
personnel in neighboring Contra Costa County and Berkeley in addition to those already 
identified in Alameda County. Appropriate individuals from those organizations were 
therefore invited by the ACPHD to participate in the exercise. All of the participants and 
their affiliations are listed in Table 1. In order to facilitate discussions during the 
exercise, the participants were grouped according to the expertise they represented. Five 
groups, or teams, were defined: 
(1)  Public Health Officer 
(2) Health Department A (communicable diseases, nursing, lab) 
(3) Health Department B (environmental health, Berkeley health, community 
(4) Emergency Medical Services (AlameddContra Costa, hospital) 
planning) 
CHART A-I - 
Figure 2. Reporting protocols for suspected bioterrorism related illnesses including overlap with 
WMD-DAC simulation components. Underlying figure taken from ACPHD BRP dated December 1, 
2002. 
(5) Law Enforcement and State Agencies (FBI, CA Dept. Health Servicedoffice of 
Emergency Services). 
The group assignment of each participant is also given in Table 1. 
The exercise was conducted June 12,2003, in the SNUCA Visualization Design Center. 
Appendix A is the agenda of exercise activities. Three pre-defined pauses were 
introduced in the exercise: one prior to the start of the simulation and two while the 
simulation was executing. These pauses were designed to allow the groups to discuss 
and decide on appropriate actions based on the information they received during the 
exercise. Inter-group discussions were also encouraged during these pauses. The results 
of the group discussions were summarized on forms developed for the exercise. The 
forms completed by the participants are collected in Appendix B. 
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WMD-DAC 
Overlap 
Figure 3. Flow of notification and response operations in ACPHD including overlap with WMD- 
DAC simulation components. Underlying flgure taken from ACPHD BRP dated December 1,2002. 
9 
Table 1. Outside Participants in the June 12,2003 Exercise. 
Participant Name Affiliation Group Number 
Dr. Tony lton ACa Health Officer 1 
Dr. Barbara Allen AC Communicable Diseases 1 
Dr. Poki Na 
Linda Frank AC Communicable Diseases 2 
Berkeley Health Officer 
Allison James 
Elaine Conley 
Sheila Proctor 
Bill Raynolds 
Bill Pitcher 
David Boone 
AC Communicable Diseases 2 
61y 
AC Public Health Nursing 
AC Public Health Nursin 
Family Health SAl)hi 
AC Public Information Office 3 
AC Environmental Health 3 
AC Environmental Healt 
AC  CAPE^ 3 
Dina Quan Berkeley Health Department 3 
AC Emergency Med. Service 
AC Emergency Med. Service 
Dan Guerra 
Dr. Arnie Spanjers Hospital Representative/Kaiser 4 
Jim Devitt 4 
an Butler 
Jan McClellai. AC Office of Emeraencv Services 
Relda Roberson-Becklev CA Dept. of HealthSeiices 5 
Barb Center CC Ae~lon I I  MediiUHaRh '-is 
Dr. Rosilyn Ryals AC Communicable Disease All 
Jim Morrissey AC Emergency Med. Services All 
Alameda County 
bCommunity Assessment Planning and Education 
Contra Costa County 
a 
C 
2 Exercise Execution and Results 
The first pause was introduced after the exercise context was established. This context 
placed the participants in the month of January with a recently heightened national 
security alert level (Homeland Security Advisory System raised to Red status) and 
intercepted intelligence suggesting that the San Francisco Bay area might be a terrorist 
target. Key responses from the groups captured on the Pause 1 decision forms in 
Appendix B include: 
Communicate heightened alert to staff 
Confirm status/availability of emergency and hack up supplies and equipment 
Ensure communication channels are open betweedwithin organizations 
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Implement CA EMS/hospital red alert recommended actions 
ReddiNet survey of all hospitals 
Staff CA OES at minimum level to support EOC 
The second pause was introduced when the simulation generated the first presumptive 
diagnosis of an “unusual respiratory illness” at one of the sentinel hospitals. A number of 
additional suspicious cases and their distribution (number of illnesses in particular census 
track locations) were also identified before each group was asked to consider their next 
course of action. During this pause, Group One was given additional details about the 
presumptive diagnosis, and they announced to all participants that the symptoms of the 
unusual respiratory illness suggest that the illness was probably inhalation anthrax, but 
confirmation from laboratory tests had not been received. Key responses from the groups 
captured on the Pause 2 decision forms in Appendix B include: 
Conduct detailed epidemiologicakommunicable disease investigation on suspect 
caseshdentify commonalities 
Exercise county mutual aid agreements 
Communicate to state Region I1 
Inform FBI who will coordinate criminaVepidemiological investigation with 
public health authorities 
Formulate press release 
Ask state DHS for public information announcement 
Issue alerts to health care system componentshncrease surveillance 
Assure availability of Cipro and Doxy to paramedics and hospital staff 
Activate EOC and ECRS 
Assess status of pharmaceutical supplies 
Begin organization of clinics for health care and prophylaxis distribution 
The simulation provides several action options to the Public Health Officer role, Group 
One. These options include alerting the community, alerting the Strategic National 
Stockpile (SNS) (national emergency source of pharmaceuticals) and setting up 
prophylaxis distribution centers. The only action taken at this pause was authorizing a 
press conference to provide status information to the public. 
The third and final pause occurred after one additional day had passed in the simulation. 
During that day, a large number and a wide distribution of confirmed inhalation anthrax 
cases were reported. Key responses from the groups captured on the Pause 3 decision 
forms in Appendix B include: 
Provide prophylaxis to all who live or work in affected areas / priority to hospital 
and health care workers working in facilities that are likely to have been exposed 
to anthrax 
Coordinate with local law enforcement for security of facilities to be used for 
clinics and drug distribution 
Seek alternate clinic and distribution centers outside of affected areas 
Stage prophylaxis clinics 
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County OES will ramp up logistics for SNS and other response assets 
State DHS will initiate full command center in collaboration with internal and 
external partners / send out info via CAHAN to all counties and coordinate CDC 
FBI continues investigation to identify, apprehend and prosecute those 
responsible / find and process crime scene (anthrax release point) / coordinate 
activities through JOC and information through JIC 
Request SNS pharmaceuticals and Vendor Managed Inventory 
Consider evacuation procedures 
Request assistance from National Guard and other federal resources 
Continue collection information about new cases and investigate circumstances 
Conduct press conference, coordinate news releases with state and national 
agencies, and establish procedures for regular news advisories 
Share information and attempt to put out one consistent message 
Evaluate and augment surge capacity at local hospitals 
Seek expert help on plume modeling from national labs 
Advise Public Health Officer to activate federal Disaster Medical Assistance 
Teams (DMAT) and Disaster Mortuary Teams (DMORT) 
Actions following this pause included a press conference announcing the size and extent 
of the disease outbreak and providing links to other sources of information related to the 
emergency, as well as the selection and stocking of prophylaxis distribution centers. 
Several photographs showing the presentation and team interaction components of the 
exercise are collected in Appendix C. These photographs reveal the high level of 
engagement of the participants in the exercise. 
3 Analysis of Exercise Participant Decision Processes 
Members of the Sandia facilitation team had an excellent opportunity to observe the 
decision-making processes of the participating health and law enforcement professionals 
as they performed their functions during the course of this exercise. The setting was also 
felt to be fairly realistic because response to the simulated anthrax attack required both 
joint and mutually dependent decisions by multiple organizations under conditions of 
high stress. The participants working in Group One were designated as the primary 
decision makers. The construct of the exercise forced them to deal with four critical 
factors in conjunction with the decision process: 
1. High time pressure - The negative consequences of delayed decisions could 
significantly increase the total number of simulated casualties in the scenario. 
The timing of the Public Health Officer’s decisions on alerting the community, 
alerting the Strategic National Stockpile, and activating prophylaxis distribution 
centers had a direct impact on the final number of casualties. 
2. Incomplete data - There were limited data available about the attack at each of the 
three pause points and during the entire exercise. By design, the participants were 
not aware of the ground truth of the attack-a situation that is likely comparable 
to the reality of an actual bioterrorism event. Fragmented data resided in different 
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organizations and were often disguised by background noise or delayed in transit. 
For example, during the first planned pause, the FBI agent representing the law- 
enforcement organization had additional relevant-but security sensitive- 
information. In addition, Group One received some of the medical details about 
the first presumptive diagnosis during the second pause. They then had to decide 
is those details should be released to the participants at large prior to being 
confirmed. Because each sub-group had access to different information, it was 
natural for each of them to create their own mental picture of the attack and to 
recommend actions accordingly. Reaching consensus on joint decisions, 
however, required all of the participating sub-groups to develop a shared mental 
model. The quality and effectiveness of the decisions of Group One depended on 
how well they compiled the distributed and fragmented data. 
3. High negative consequences - In addition to delayed decisions, premature and 
incorrect decisions could contribute to public panic, financial loss, tarnished 
individual or organizational reputations, and potential loss of lives. The WMD- 
DAC simulation challenged the Public Health Officer to make timely but correct 
decisions according to the ACPHD BRP. 
4. Limited trust - There were 26 participants in the exercise from federal, state, and 
county government representing many different health, emergency services, and 
law-enforcement organizations. The ad-hoc nature of the team formation, 
differences in organization culture, and conflicting task focus such as criminal and 
epidemiological investigation can potentially interfere with team trust. Inter- 
group communications were encouraged at the beginning of the exercise and 
during the three pre-defined pauses to provide opportunities for the participants to 
build the required trust. 
As described above, the three pre-planned pauses in the exercise were designed to 
support the participants in addressing communication and decision-making problems at 
interfaces between agencies and the decision makers. During each of these pauses, 
participants were asked to decide what they would do based on the information they had 
received up to that point. After the sub-groups presented their decisions to the entire 
community and there was a brief dialogue among the sub-groups, Group One, acting in 
the role of the Public Health Officer, relayed the community’s joint decisions to Sandia 
facilitators so that it could be incorporated into the continuing WMD-DAC scenario. 
As the participants were interacting, communicating, and making their decisions, the 
Sandia facilitators carried out an informal and subjective observation that was broadly 
based on the Interaction Pmess Analysis method introduced by Bales’. This method 
divides team interactions into the four categories that ace summarized below along with 
the results of the informal analysis done by the Sandia facilitators. 
1.  Social-Emotional Area (positive reactions) -Participants used about twenty 
percent of the time to raise the stature of others, gave help, and rewarded each 
other. On several occasions, appropriate jokes and laughs helped to release task 
R. F. Bales, Interaction Process Analysis: A Method for the Study of Small Groups, Addison-Wesley 1 
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1950. 
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tensions. During sub-group presentations, the community showed passive 
acceptance and understanding. 
2. Task Area (attempted answers) - About forty percent of the time, the 
participants gave suggestions and directions from the perspective of their nctional 
areas in sub-group discussions and presentations, debriefings, and community 
dialogues. They offered their opinions, analysis, and expressed feelings and 
concerns. Very often, they repeated, clarified, and confirmed their analyses, 
expert opinions, and recommendations. 
3. Task Area (questions) -With the remaining forty percent, they asked the Sandia 
facilitators for orientation, and each other for information, repetition, and 
confirmation. During many of the sub-group communication and community 
dialogues, they asked for opinions, evaluations, directions, as well as for possible 
courses of action. 
4. Social-Emotional Area (negative reactions) - Our informal observation did not 
detect either passive rejection or withholding of support from any participant. 
Everyone was fully engaged with the exercise, and no individual withdrew from 
the process. There were no attempts to deflate the status of others or to assert an 
individual’s position for self-interest only. 
The group appeared to build team trust and integrated their differences quickly by 
embracing very healthy communication patterns. Individuals and sub-groups were very 
willing to risk and share information. The group effectively built its shared mental 
model of the attack and made effective joint decisions accordingly. The benefits of their 
effective decision-making process reflected positively on the results of the exercise. 
4 Debrief and Lessons Learned 
The formal debrief of the exercise focused on defining actions the participants planned to 
take in order to improve the ACPHD BRP. In addition, the participants were asked to 
record their specific impressions of the simulated attack, including both the content of the 
exercise materials and the process of conducting the exercise. All of the debrief 
summaries obtained from the groups are collected in Appendix D. A consistent theme in 
these summaries is that the exercise was very helpful in building relationships between 
the various organizations represented by the participants, including those that span local 
and state jurisdictions. Many of these organizations are the ones that would be activated 
and must communicate effectively in crisis situations of this type. The high level of 
realism provided by the simulation was another aspect of the exercise that was frequently 
noted in the debrief materials. In particular, as the scenario played out, participants were 
required to make decisions even though the information that was available to them was 
incomplete, which is also likely to be the case in real-world emergency situations. 
The participants identified several important lessons learned relative to the ACPHD BRP 
as a result of their involvement with the exercise. These are summarized as follows: 
Job-Specific Action Forms should be developed for each of the BRP key players 
in order to clarify roles and responsibilities and the appropriate communication 
channels to be followed when the ACPHD BRP is activated in a crisis. 
A Bioterrorism Coordinator position should be established in the ACPHD. 
14 
The prophylaxis distribution plan should be reviewed and modified in an effort to 
enhance its flexibility to accommodate multiple crisis scenarios. 
Relationships between the roles of Law Enforcement and Public Health should be 
clarified to aid in pursuing criminaVepidemiologica1 investigations. 
Training and hands-on experience should be increased for individuals at all 
response levels. 
Policy makers should be included in future training exercises. 
15 
Appendix A. 
Agenda 
I. 
Alameda County Public Health Department 
Sandia National Laboratories A 
- ism Respoi- - e  Exercis 
June 12,2003 
llpst 
8:30 am Sandia Arrival & Badging ...................................................... Badge Office 
Visualization Design Center (VDC) 
Building 912, Room 096A 
9:00 am Welcome ......................................................................... Howard Hirano 
Manager, Advanced Technologies (925) 294-2053 
9:05 am Agenda Items ........................................................................ Ricky Tam 
Tam: Staff Technologist, Videoconference & Collaboration Technology (925) 294-2213 
9:lO am Alameda County Public Health Dept. Exercise Goals ...... Jim Morrissey 
9:15 am Introduction to WMD-DACIBio and Exercise Context ............ Todd West 
West: Principal Member of the Technical Staff, System Studies Department (925) 294-3224 
9:45 am PAUSE 1 -Team Reactions to Context .............. Todd WestlRicky Tam 
West: Principal Member of the Technical Staff, System studies Department (925) 294-3224 
Tam: Staff Technologist, Videoconference & Collaboration Technology (925) 294-221 3 
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Appendix A 
1O:OO am WMD-DAC/Bio Simulation ......................... ... Todd West, Dawn Manley 
& Heidi Ammerlahn 
West: Principal Member of the Technical Staff, System Studies Department (925) 294-3224 
Manley: Sfaff Technologist, Sysfem Studies Department (925) 294-4589 
Ammerlahn: Staff Technologisf, Systems Research Department (925) 294-3066 
10:20 am PAUSE 2 - Team Discussions and Decision Making 
1 1 :00 am Break 
11 :15 am Restart Simulation 
1 1 :30 am PAUSE 3 - Team Discussions and Decision Making 
12:15 pm Conclude Simulation 
12:30 pm Lunch 
1:15 pm Discussion of Simulation Parameters 
2:OO pm Debrief 
3:OO pm Adjourn 
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Appendix C. 
Selected Photographs of Exercise Process and Team Interactions 
1 - 
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Appendix C 
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Appendix D 
Appendix D. 
Summary of Debriefing 
Team 1 / Debrief - Dr. Tony Iton, Dr. Barbara Allen, Dr. Poki Namkung 
Meeting Goals 
Benefit of BTRP is planning process, not necessarily pladdocument itself 
Building relationships with your department 
Setting expectation of roles 
Did not refer to plan during process 
Don’t expect to ever pull up document in real situation 
Operations to work with other divisions 
Environmental health-need to work with constituent cities 
Pleased to learn about kinds of resources available 
In reality, would get together in same room 
I don’t want to be in EOC, want to be with my people 
EOC doesn’t have my resources 
My info would be at my place 
(Team 2 Need Info Systems to be here- to develop forms etc. 
Team 4 Need for job action sheets-BT plan is large 
Team 5 Did not see plan ahead of time 
HAZMAT needs to be here, going out, taking samples) 
Action Item List 
Make sure prophy clinics defined - size and capacity 
CDC BT funding - post event vaccination clinic for smallpox 
UCB task force - detail by detail what did they do for SARS clinics 
West Nile planning helped for BT planning 
Intense Training Field epi teams 
ENV Health-important role-how to ask them for sampling, make sure sufficient capacity 
Weather modeling 
Communications-work out strategy 
If chem. spill - go to EOC 
If BT, go to clearinghouse (stay at office) & send comm. Rep to EOC 
Hire BT staff 
Political ramifications-bring policymakers in to think through issues 
Team 2- more TT exercises, clarify lines of comm. & roles 
Team 3- operating checklist 
Team 4- work out prophy distribution 
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Appendix D 
Team 2 / Debrief 
Erika Jenssen, Linda Frank, Allison James, Sheila Proctor, Dena Andersen 
Short-term action plan 
More practice sessions and tabletop exercises 
With Public Health internally 
With FBUOES/DHS in order to clarify communication lines and performance 
expectations 
Staff 
Identify prophy sites and work on MOUs with citieslschool districts 
Training for health department managers about emergency management 
Hire a BT Coordinator 
36 
Appendix D 
Team 3 I Debrief -- Quan/KuhnlDeichman/Boone/PitchedRaynolds 
Goal 1: Test Bioterrorism response plan: Didn’t get to test the plan per se but were able to test 
the people and their abilities to think together through a complex problem 
Goal 2: Were able to work with other players in BT Response plan and get to know their roles 
and responsibilities 
Goal 3: Learned the roles of the external agencies and became somewhat more familiar with the 
individuals. 
Potential Action Items: 
Develop standard operations procedure checklists, applicable to specific roles. 
Review emergency back up status, who is updating them, etc. 
Beef up knowledge of local resources as well as available external resources, Le. mutual 
aid, national, etc. 
More and more wide spread/broad based trainingkabletop exercises 
Periodic and frequent update of telephone and address lists 
Test of page system to determine percentage of responses and response times. 
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Team 4 / Debrief - GuerralSuIIivan/Pointer/Spanjers/Devittl 
Moderately successful given the timeframe (plan is very comprehensive) 
Excellent opportunity to work with other departments 
High quality of interaction 
Good understanding of resources available 
Job action check sheet needed 
Short-term action 
More inter agency/jurisdiction planning/exercises 
Work out the strategic pharmaceutical distribution 
Pre identify alternate treatment sites (field treatment sites, CCP, designated hospitals, etc) 
finalize plan for distributing pharmaceutical stockpile. 
Surge capacity/ triage of worried well. 
Coordination of public information among all agencies 
Bring in additional staff for training. 
Bring info to department levels, extrapolate training to local level 
Identify key State agencies to interact with 
Process: well organized, prepared, obvious thought and attention paid to preparation. 
38 
Appendix D 
Team 5 /Debrief OES, DHS, EMSA, FBI 
Test the ACPHD BTR Plan and identify strengths and weaknesses: 
This group didn’t have the plan to test it. 
Provide ouDortunitv to work with all PH divisions/deuartments resoonding to BT event: 
Didn’t have information how each department would have been affected. 
Provide an ouoortunitv to work with external apencies: 
Yes. We did hear about the response procedures of external agencies. 
Next Stem: 
OES 
Ensure other agencies know capabilities and resources available 
DHS 
Use simulated data to conduct more tabletop exercises with all parties involved in the plan (i.e. 
security, hazmat) 
EMSA 
Learn how Regional Memealth component is written into the BTR Plan; assure realistic 
expectations 
F B I  
Conduct training with Public Health departments with regard to joint criminal/epidemiological 
investigations 
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